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Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement as an 
Instrument of Coercion  
Kelly M. Greenhill[1] 
Coercion is generally understood to refer to the practice of inducing or preventing changes in 
political behavior through the use of threats, intimidation, or some other form of pressure—most 
commonly, military force. This article focuses on a very particular nonmilitary method of 
applying coercive pressure—the use of migration and refugee crises as instruments of 
persuasion. Conventional wisdom suggests this kind of coercion is rare at best.[2] Traditional 
international relations theory avers that it should rarely succeed. In fact, given the asymmetry in 
capabilities that tends to exist between would be coercers and their generally more powerful 
targets, it should rarely even be attempted.[3] However, as this article demonstrates, not only is 
this kind of coercion attempted far more frequently than the accepted wisdom would suggest but 
that it also tends to succeed far more often than capabilities-based theories would predict. 
The article is organized as follows: I begin by outlining the logic behind the coercive use of 
purposefully created migration and refugee crises and discuss its relative—if under-recognized—
prevalence.[4] In the second section, I briefly describe the kind of actors who resort to the use of 
this unconventional weapon as well as highlight the diverse array of objectives sought by those 
who employ it. I also show that this kind of coercion has proven relatively successful, at least as 
compared to more traditional methods of persuasion, particularly against (generally more 
powerful) liberal democratic targets. In the third section, I propose an explanation for why 
democracies appear to have been most frequently (and most successfully) targeted. I also 
advance my broader theory about the nature of migration-driven coercion, including how, why, 
and under what conditions it can prove efficacious. I conclude with a brief discussion of broader 
implications and further applications of the theory. 
Defining, Measuring, and Identifying Coercive Engineered Migration 
Coercive engineered migrations (or coercion-driven migrations) are “those cross-border 
population movements that are deliberately created or manipulated in order to induce political, 
military and/or economic concessions from a target state or states.”[5] The instruments employed 
to affect this kind of coercion are myriad and diverse. They run the gamut from compulsory to 
permissive, from the employment of hostile threats and the use of military force (as were used 
during the 1967-1970 Biafran and 1992-1995 Bosnian civil wars) through the offer of positive 
inducements and provision of financial incentives (as were offered to North Vietnamese by the 
United States in 1954-1955, following the First Indochina War) to the straightforward opening of 





Coercive engineered migration is frequently, but not always, undertaken in the context of 
population outflows strategically generated for other reasons. In fact, it represents just one subset 
of a broader class of events that all rely on the creation and exploitation of such crises as means 
to political and military ends—a phenomenon I call strategic engineered migration.[7] Coercive 
engineered migration is often embedded within mass migrations strategically engineered for 
dispossessive, exportive, or militarized reasons. It is likely, at least in part as a consequence of its 
embedded and often camouflaged nature, that its prevalence has also been generally under-
recognized and its significance, underappreciated. Indeed, it is a phenomenon that for many 
observers has been hiding in plain sight. For instance, it is widely known that in 1972 Idi Amin 
expelled most Asians from Uganda in what has been commonly interpreted as a naked attempt at 
economic asset expropriation.[8] Far less well understood, however, is the fact that 
approximately 50,000 of those expelled were British passport-holders, and that these expulsions 
happened at the same time that Amin was trying to convince the British to halt their drawdown 
of military assistance to his country. In short, Amin announced his intention to foist 50,000 
refugees on the British, but did so with a convenient ninety-day grace period to give the British 
an opportunity to rescind their decision regarding aid.[9] And Amin was far from unique. 
Measuring Incidence 
In fact, well over forty groups of displaced people have been used as pawns in at least fifty-six 
discrete attempts at coercive engineered migration since the advent of the 1951 United Nations 
Refugee Convention alone. An additional eight cases are suggestive but inconclusive or 
“indeterminate.”[10] (See Table 1) Employment of this kind of coercion predates the post-World 
War II era.[11] However, I focus on the post-1951 period because it was only after World War 
II—and particularly after ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention—that international rules 
and norms regarding the protection of those fleeing violence and persecution were codified.[12] 
It was likewise only then that migration and refugees “became a question of high politics” and 
that, for reasons discussed later in this article, the potential efficacy of this unconventional 
strategy really began to blossom.[13] 
To put the prevalence of coercive engineered migration in perspective, at a rate of at least 1.0 
cases/year (between 1951 and 2006), it is significantly less common than interstate territorial 
disputes (approximately 4.82 cases/year). But, at the same time, it appears to be markedly more 
prevalent than both intrastate wars (approximately 0.68 cases/year) and extended intermediate 
deterrence crises (approximately 0.58/year). At a minimum, this suggests that the conventional 
wisdom about the relative infrequency of coercive engineered migration (my operative null 
hypothesis) requires reconsideration. More ambitiously, it suggests that what we think we know 
about the size and nature of the policy toolbox available to, and used by, state and non-state 
actors may too require reconsideration. A failure to appreciate the relative pervasiveness of a 
frequently employed policy weapon can actively impede the ability of both scholars and 




victimized by its use. 
The imperative to pay greater attention to this phenomenon is underlined by the recognition that 
the actual number of cases since 1951 may in fact be larger than the fifty-six to sixty-four I have 
heretofore identified. In addition to the aforementioned fact that this kind of coercion is 
sometimes embedded within outflows also engineered for other reasons, identification of cases 
tends to be further impeded by two other mutually reinforcing tendencies. On one side of the 
equation, states that have been successfully targeted in the past are often reluctant to advertise 
that fact, even within their own foreign policy establishments. Consider, for instance, that the 
now infamous 1980 Mariel boatlift had been underway for close to ten days before Victor 
Palmieri, then U.S. coordinator for refugee affairs, discovered that 1980 was not the first time 
Cuban President Fidel Castro had attempted to use a mass migration to force concessions by the 
United States; nor, moreover, did it prove to be the last.[14] 
Failing to share such critical information can prove highly problematic in the context of crisis 
decision-making. Nevertheless, such reticence is not wholly surprising. Not only may publicizing 
past vulnerabilities make a target more susceptible to future predation, but it may also heighten 
the political costs to be paid within the state’s own polity. After all, what leader wants to 
voluntarily admit having been forced to offer concessions to actors who are commonly portrayed 
in the media and public fora not as formidable adversaries but, rather, as pathetic foes worthy of 
derision—for instance, a “tin-pot dictator” like Fidel Castro or an “obsequious” “tyrant” like 
Erich Honecker?[15] On the other side of the equation, some would-be coercers issue their 
threats and demands only privately. For virtually every obvious challenger, such as Belarussian 
President Lukashenko, who in 2002 and 2004 publicly proclaimed that, “if the Europeans don’t 
pay, we will not protect Europe from these flows,”[16] one can identify a far less visible 
counterexample. After the Six Day War, for instance, King Hussein of Jordan privately made 
clear to U.S. diplomats that it was well within his power to turn the ongoing Palestinian refugee 
crisis into a major embarrassment for both the United States and Israel if the United States failed 
to exert sufficient diplomatic pressure on the Israelis to take back those displaced by the war—a 
case I discovered simply by chance while in the archives perusing previously classified 
documents on Vietnam.[17] To go from the particular to the general, one can only wonder how 
many other such cases might remain unrecognized. In short, irrespective of whether coercion 
succeeds or fails, cases in which threats were issued only privately can be difficult to identify. 
Moreover, issued threats may be not only private but also conspicuously ambiguous. Consider, 
for example, the suggestive reply of then Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter during their historic 1979 meeting. After Carter asserted that the United States 
could not trade freely with China until its record on human rights improved and Chinese were 
allowed to emigrate freely, Deng smilingly retorted, “Okay. Well then, exactly how many 
Chinese would you like, Mr. President? One million? Ten million? Thirty million?”[18] Whether 
Deng actually intended to influence U.S. behavior remains unclear, but, in point of fact, his 
rejoinder reportedly stopped Carter cold and summarily ended their discussion of human rights 




fact that the migration crisis in question was merely hypothetical—effectively excludes it (and 
all similarly murky events) from inclusion in my database of cases. Nevertheless, as I illustrate in 
the next section, even excluding all such cases, there has still been on average at least one 
attempt at coercive engineered migration per year since the Refugee Convention came into 
force.[20] In short, whether publicly announced or privately implied, by threatening (or actually 
creating or catalyzing) migration crises oneself, or by pleading an inability or unwillingness to 
control crises generated by others, if conditions are right, these unnatural disasters can be 
effectively exploited and manipulated in ways that allow a variety of would-be coercers to 
extract political and economic concessions from their targets. 
Types of Coercers, Their Objectives and Rates of Success  
Coercive engineered migration can be exercised by three distinct types of challengers: 
generators, agents provocateurs, and opportunists. Generators directly create or threaten to create 
cross-border population movements unless targets concede to their demands. Agents 
provocateurs by contrast do not create crises directly, but rather deliberately act in ways 
designed to incite others to generate outflows. Many see themselves as engaging in a kind of 
altruistic Machiavellianism, whereby the ends (e.g., autonomy, independence, or the restoration 
of democracy) justify the employment of these rather unconventional means. Finally, 
opportunists play no direct role in the creation of migration crises, but simply exploit for their 
own gain the existence of outflows generated or catalyzed by others. So, when these would-be 
coercers—be they opportunists, generators, or agents provocateurs—employ coercive 
engineered migration, what do they seek, and how effective have past attempts been in helping 
these challengers achieve their aims? 
Just as is the case with traditional military coercion, the demands of challengers who engage in 
migration-driven coercion have been highly varied in scope, content, and magnitude. Demands 
have been both concrete and symbolic and have comprised entreaties both to undertake actions 
and to cease undertaking them. They have run the gamut from the simple provision of financial 
aid to the termination of insurgent funding to full-scale military intervention and even regime 
change (see Table 1). And, despite the fact that the majority of challengers have been markedly 
weaker than their targets (in 54/64 total possible cases, and 49/56 determinate cases), they have 
been relatively successful; in fact, they have been more successful than their more powerful 
counterparts. 
Success in this context is defined as persuading a target to change a previously articulated policy, 
stop or reverse an action already undertaken, or disburse side payments, in line with a 
challenger’s demands; in other words, most of a challenger’s demands were met. A case is coded 
as a “Success” if the challenger achieved most or all of its known objectives and as a “Partial 
Success” if the challenger achieved a significant fraction, but not all, of its aims. A case is coded 
as a “Failure” if the challenger achieved few or none of its objectives, or achieved its objectives 
for what appear to be exogenous reasons. Finally, a case is coded as “Indeterminate” if (1) the 




insufficient evidence to conclude that coercion was in the end actually attempted; or (3) threats 
were issued but a crisis never materialized, and it remains unclear, as of this writing, whether the 
challenger’s demands were met. (Indeterminate cases are excluded from aggregate assessments 
of coercive success and failure.) 
Table 1: Challengers’ Objectives, Relative Strengths and Coercive Outcomes* 
Year Challenger/Coercer (Principal) Target(s) Principal Objective(s) Outcome? 
1953 West Germany (O) United States Financial aid, political support Partial Success 
1954-55 S. Vietnam & the US (G) North Vietnam Defer/cancel reunification elections Failure 
1954-60 Algerian insurgents (AP) 
French allies, esp. the 
United States 
Convince allies to pressure France to 
relinquish Algeria; political-military 
intervention 
Partial Success 
1956 Austria (O) United States Aid and resettlement Success 
1961 United States (AP/O) Soviet Union Deterrence re: Berlin Indeterminate 
1965 Cuba (G) United States Regularized immigration Partial Success 
1967-70 Biafran insurgents (G) United States 
Aid; intervention; political and 
diplomatic support Partial Success 
1967 Israel (G) Jordan Bilateral negotiations/peace talks Indeterminate 
1967 Jordan (O) United States Pressure Israel re: Palestinian return SR Success;        LR Failure** 
1971 Pakistan (G) India Cease support for Bengali rebels Failure 
1972 Uganda (G) United Kingdom Rescind decision re: military assistance Failure 
1978-82 Bangladesh (G/O) Burma Halt outflow of Burmese Muslims Success 
1978-82 ASEAN, Hong Kong (O) 
Western great 
powers, esp. the US Resettlement and financial aid Success 
1979 Vietnam (G/O) EC, US Aid, diplomatic recognition, credit Indeterminate 
1979-
80s Thailand (O) United States; China 
An alliance; political-military 
support Success 
1979-81 Haiti (G) United States Financial and military aid Success 
1979-81 NGO activists  United States; Haiti End support for regime; undermine it Failure 
1980s Pakistan (O) United States Alliance; political-military support Success 
1979-
80s Soviet Union (G) Pakistan Cease support for insurgents Failure 
1979-
80s Exiled insurgents (O) Pakistan Control over peace settlement Success 
1980 Cuba (G) United States End hijacking; normalize migration, etc. Partial Success 
1981-82 Austria (O) W. Europe; United States Refugee resettlement and aid Success 
1982 Thailand (O) United States; France Financial aid Success 
early 
80s Honduras (O) United States Military aid, training; security pact Success 
80s-
1997 Bangladesh (G) India 
End Shanti Bahini (insurgent) 
funding Indeterminate 
1983-86 East Germany (AP) West Germany Aid; tech assistance; border fixity Success 
1984-85 East Germany (AP) Sweden Financial aid Success 
1985 Libya (G) TEM*** Shift diplomatic alliances/positions Indeterminate 
late 80s Hong Kong, ASEAN (O) US; W. Europe Aid and resettlement Success 
1989-




1989-92 Bangladesh (G) Burma Halt outflow of Burmese Muslims Success 
1990-92 Saudi Arabia (G) Yemen Change position on Gulf War/Iraq Failure 
1990s- Israel (AP/O) Palestinians Relinquish claims on Jerusalem Failure (so far) 
1991-92 United States (O) Israel Stop settlements in Occupied Territories Partial Success 
1990-91 Albania (G) Italy Food aid, financial credits & other assist. Success 
1991 Albania (G) Italy, EC Financial aid Success 
1990-94 Albania (G) Greece Financial aid Success 
1991 Poland (G,/AP) EC, United States Debt relief; financial aid Indeterminate 
1990 Ethiopia (G) Israel Monetary payoff Success 
1991 Turkey (O) United States Humanitarian-military intervention Success 
1992-94 Jean-Bertrand Aristide (AP) United States 
Return to power; US military 
intervention Success 
1992-95 Bosniaks (G/AP) UN Security Council Troop presence; air evacuation Partial Success 
1994 Poland (O) Germany Monetary payoff Success 
1994 Cuba (G) United States Regularized immigration, etc. Success 
mid 90s Zaire (O) Largely US, France, and Belgium Political-diplomatic recognition, aid Success 
1995 Libya (AP/O) Egypt Lifting of sanctions; shift in policy towards Palestinians Failure 
mid 90s North Korea (G) China Financial aid, political support Success 
1997 Albania (G) Italy Military intervention Success 
1998 Turkey (G) Italy Support/Punishment re: EU bid Indeterminate 
1998-99 Kosovar Albanians (AP) NATO Military aid, intervention Success 
1998-99 FRY (G) 
NATO, esp. 
Germany, Greece and 
Italy 
Deterrence, then compellence Failure 
1998-99 Macedonia I (O) NATO Financial aid Success 
1999 Macedonia II (O) NATO Financial aid Success 
2001-03 Nauru (O) Australia Financial aid Success 
2002 Belarus (AP) EU Diplomatic recognition; aid Failure 
2002-05 Activists/NGO network (AP) China Policy shift on NK; regime collapse Failure 
2002-05 Activists/NGO network (AP) South Korea Same as above Failure 
2002-
06+ 
North Korea (NK) 
(G) China Continued diplomatic support & aid Success 
2004 Nauru (O) Australia Financial aid Success 
2004 Haiti (G) United States Military assistance Failure 
2004 Belarus (AP) EU Financial aid Failure 
2004 Libya (AP) EU Lifting of sanctions Success 
2004-05 Chad (G) UN Security Council Military/political intervention Indeterminate 
2006 Libya (AP/O) EU Financial aid Partial Success 
Challenger (and Type) (Generator (G), Agent(s) Provocateurs (AP), Opportunist (O)];* Where discernable, the more 
powerful actor (challenger v. target) is shown in grey; ** SR=short run, LR=long run; ***Tunisia, Egypt and 
Mauritania 
In the fifty-six determinate cases, challengers achieved at least some of their objectives 
approximately 73 percent of the time (in forty-one cases). If one imposes a stricter measure of 
success and excludes partial successes, coercers got more or less everything they reportedly 




restrictive rate is comparable to some of the best-case estimates of deterrence success (also 57 
percent) and substantially greater than best estimates of the success of economic sanctions 
(approximately 33 percent) or U.S. coercive diplomacy efforts (between 19 and 37.5 
percent).[21] As Table 1 also intimates, this kind of coercion has been attempted in all types of 
crises—humanitarian disasters, low-intensity conflicts, and full-scale wars—as well as in cases 
in which crises have been latent or only threatened. 
This discussion notwithstanding, one might still conclude that selection effects-related issues mean 
that this kind of coercion is still a pretty poor method of persuasion, undertaken only by highly 
resolved challengers and only when they believe there is a relatively high probability of 
success.[22] To be sure, for a variety of reasons, coercive engineered migration is a blunt 
instrument that is rarely a weapon of first resort. First, challengers may ultimately catalyze larger 
crises than they anticipate or desire, and massive outflows can destabilize both states of origin and 
destination.[23] Fears of just such a collapse, for instance, led to the construction of the Berlin 
Wall in the early 1960s.[24] 
Second, once crises have been initiated, challengers often lose (some degree of) control over 
them, in no small part because engineered migration-related “cleansing” operations may be 
carried out by irregulars, or even bands of thugs, who lack discipline and whose objectives may 
not be synonymous with those who instigated the outflows.[25] Likewise, once migrants and 
refugees find themselves outside their states of origin, they are often capable of autonomous 
actions—they might move in different directions and do so in smaller or larger numbers than 
challengers desire. When this happens, outflows can become more like unguided missiles than 
smart bombs, making coercing particular targets more difficult.  
Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, “the ideal compellent action would be one that, once 
initiated, causes minimal harm if compliance is forthcoming and great harm if compliance is not 
forthcoming.”[26] Nevertheless, although migration and refugee movements, once initiated, can 
be stopped, under certain conditions they can be difficult to undo. As such, threats of further 
escalation can be quite persuasive, but promises of minimal harm in the face of compliance can 
be difficult to keep, thereby potentially reducing the value of concession for targets. Indeed, 
evidence suggests that both China and South Korea viewed concession to the activists trying to 
compel them to embrace and admit North Korean migrants as likely to stimulate greater future 
harm by encouraging more individuals to follow in their footsteps. Not surprisingly, coercion in 
this case failed.[27] 
Fourth, the potential for blowback can be great and the intended consequences quite costly. For 
instance, not only did the U.S.-instigated mass migration of North Vietnamese southward 
following the First Indochina War fail to achieve its stated objective of deterring Ho Chi Minh 
from pushing for reunification elections, but it also inadvertently further weakened the sitting 
regime in South Vietnam while simultaneously increasing the U.S. commitment to propping it 
up.[28] And although Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire benefited significantly from the concessions he 




decision to allow said refugees to use the camps as bases to launch attacks back across the border 
provoked enough ire within Rwanda that its government helped engineer his ouster.[29] 
Nevertheless, given its apparent success rate of 57-73 percent, for highly committed actors with 
few other options coercive engineered migration can still appear to be a strategy worth pursuing. 
This is particularly true for challengers seeking to influence the behavior of potentially 
vulnerable targets disinclined to accede to their demands under normal circumstances—powerful 
advanced liberal democracies. From the perspective of traditional international relations theory, 
this in and of itself represents something of a puzzle. Weak actors should only rarely challenge 
more powerful ones. So what makes the world’s most powerful democracies such attractive 
marks? Why should they—particularly, the United States—be most often and most successfully 
targeted? And, more generally, how and why does using human beings as coercive weapons ever 
work? 
How, When, and Why Does It Succeed and Fail? 
Coercers typically employ a variety of overlapping mechanisms when trying to manipulate the 
decision making of their targets, including the following five most common mechanisms: (1) 
power-base erosion—threatening a regime’s relationship with its core supporters; (2) unrest—
creating popular dissatisfaction with a regime; (3) decapitation—jeopardizing the regime 
leadership’s personal security; (4) weakening—debilitating a country as a whole; and (5) 
denial—preventing battlefield success (or political victories via military aggression).[30] 
Because coercive engineered migration relies on nonmilitary means of persuasion, the 
mechanisms of decapitation and denial are for all intents and purposes off the table. But such is 
not the case for power-base erosion, unrest, and weakening. Each of these mechanisms relies to 
varying degrees on affecting the behavior of a target’s leadership by manipulating the opinions 
and attitudes of its civilian population. The success of each in turn is predicated on the effective 
manipulation of the costs or risks imposed on that same population. In other words, operationally 
speaking, these three mechanisms rely on what are commonly known as coercion by punishment 
strategies. Challengers aim to create domestic conflict or public dissatisfaction within a target 
state in an attempt to convince its leadership to concede to the demands of the challenger rather 
than incur the anticipated (domestic and/or international) political costs of resistance. In short, 
challengers try to inflict costs on the population that are higher than the stakes in dispute.[31] 
There are two distinct, but non-mutually exclusive, pathways by which migration-driven 
coercion can be effected using punishment strategies; loosely speaking, they might be thought of 
as “capacity swamping” and “political agitating.” Simply put, capacity swamping focuses on 
manipulating the ability of targets to accept/accommodate/assimilate a given group of migrants 
or refugees, whereas political agitating focuses on the manipulating the willingness of targets to 
do so. In both swamping and agitating, coercion is effectively a dynamic two-level game, in 
which the responses of the target on the international level to threats issued or actions taken by 





Thus, as Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman suggest, “although there is obvious analytic 
appeal to treating coercion as singular and discrete events that follow a straightforward, linear 
logic,” coercive engineered migration is more appropriately viewed as “series of moves and 
countermoves in which each side acts not only based on and in anticipation of the other side’s 
moves, but also based on other changes” in the prevailing environment.[33] Somewhat 
paradoxically, evidence suggests the objective dangers posed to targets tend to be greater in the 
case of swamping but that the probability of coercive success tends to be greater in the case of 
agitating. 
In the developing world, coercive attempts most often focus on swamping and comprise threats 
to severely tax or overwhelm a target’s physical and/or economic capacity to cope with an 
influx—thereby effectively debilitating it—if it fails to concede to the coercer’s demands.[34] As 
previously suggested, although weakening is the primary coercive mechanism in play, such cases 
often also rely to some degree on the mechanisms of power-base erosion and/or general unrest. 
In locations where ethnic tensions may already be elevated, where the extension of central 
government control may be compromised even at the best of times, and where essential 
resources are limited and consensus on the legitimacy of the political regime is shaky at best, a 
large influx can present a real and persuasive threat.[35] Such was the case in late 1990, for 
instance, when Saudi Arabia expelled over 650,000 Yemenis in an attempt to compel the 
government of Yemen to rethink its “Saddam Hussein-friendly position” and policies in the lead-
up to (and during) the First Gulf War.[36] Because Yemeni citizens were highly dependent on 
remittances from guestworkers employed in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis believed the expulsions 
would engender sufficient dissatisfaction within the Yemeni population to impel them to 
pressure their government to shift allegiance.[37] 
Capacity swamping can also be an effective strategy in the West. This is particularly true if the 
incipient crisis is large and sudden, because even highly industrialized states need time to gear up 
to effectively deal with disasters, be they natural or manufactured.[38] That said, advanced 
industrial societies tend to have greater resources to bring to bear in a crisis, making threats to 
fundamentally overwhelm their physical ability to cope harder—although far from impossible—
to accomplish. Furthermore, whereas in most cases migration-driven coercion consists of threats 
to initiate an outflow unless the coercer is assuaged, in the developed world threats not to allow 
people to leave may also be successfully employed. Under such conditions, however, capacity 
swamping is obviously a moot point.[39] 
In the developed world, therefore, political agitating often supplants capacity swamping as the 
lynchpin of this kind of coercion. Specifically, challengers on the international level seek to 
influence target behavior on the domestic level by engaging in a kind of norms-enhanced 
political blackmail that relies on exploiting and exacerbating what Robert Putnam has called the 
“heterogeneity” of political and social interests within polities.[40] Exploitation of heterogeneity 
within Western states is possible because population influxes, such as those created in migration 
and refugee crises, tend to engender diverse and highly divisive responses within the societies 




immigration policy to the national interest compete with pluralistic policy demands originating at 
the party, sub-national (local and state), and sector- or class-specific levels.”[41] Like 
immigration and refugee policy more generally, real and threatened migration crises tend to split 
societies into (at least) two mutually antagonistic and often highly mobilized groups: the pro-
refugee/migrant camp and anti-refugee/migrant camp. What it means to be pro- or anti-
refugee/migrant varies depending on the target and the crisis. Pro-refugee/migrant camps may 
call for relatively limited, short-term responses, such as accepting financial responsibility for 
settling the migrant or refugee group in a third country, or far more significant (even permanent) 
commitments, such as offering the group asylum or citizenship. On the other side, anti-
refugee/migrant groups may demand that requests for financial assistance be rejected or, more 
radically, that migrants be interdicted, refugees be refused asylum or, in extreme cases, forcibly 
repatriated. The bottom line is that, because targets cannot simultaneous satisfy demands both to 
accept and reject a given group of migrants or refugees, leaders facing highly mobilized and 
highly polarized interests can find themselves on the horns of a real dilemma—whereby it may 
be impossible to satisfy the demands of one camp without alienating the other. 
Thus, it is not heterogeneity per se that make targets vulnerable. Instead, the crux of agitation-
based coercion rests on the fact that pro- and anti-camps tend to have mutually incompatible 
interests—which both camps are highly committed to defending—while at the same time target 
leaderships may have compelling political, legal, and moral reasons to avoid running afoul of 
either camp. Under such conditions, leaders may face strong domestic-level incentives to 
concede to coercers’ international-level demands. This is particularly true in those cases when 
concession is likely to make a real or threatened migration crisis cease or disappear, thereby 
freeing the besieged leader from the proverbial trap between a rock and a hard place. 
The existence of this two-level dynamic, and the potential vulnerability to which it can give rise, 
is to a certain extent not particularly surprising. Despite rhetorical pronouncements to the 
contrary, most Western liberal democracies have long had schizophrenic relationships with 
migrants and refugees. For instance, as Rogers Smith has noted, aside the liberal tradition of the 
United States and its self-identification as a “nation of immigrants,” there has been an illiberal 
tradition of “ascriptive Americanism” that envisions an ethnic core of Protestant Anglo-Saxons 
that must be protected from “external dilution.”[42] In other words, the American “romance with 
the Statue of Liberty has always been a hot and cold affair.”[42] 
The situation is not markedly different in either Europe or Asia. Germany, for example, is 
officially a no-immigration country. Nevertheless, anti-immigration rhetoric has long “been 
counteracted by extensive rights and protections for foreigners granted by the legal system, . . . 
[which] tames sovereign state power with a catalogue of universal human rights.”[44] Likewise, 
although less than 2 percent of the Japanese population is made up of foreigners—none of whom 
are Japanese citizens—the idea of a monoethnic Japan is somewhat farcical given that many 
Japanese, including the emperor, have Korean roots.[45] Nor is this Janus-faced attitude a new 
phenomenon. For example, as the authors of Refugees in an Age of Genocide note, “Of all the 




‘genuine’, but at the time German, Austrian and Czechoslovakian Jews were treated with 
ambivalence and outright hostility as well as sympathy.”[46] 
Moreover, although there are significant legal and normative distinctions that can be drawn 
between refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, “Just as in spring 1940, when German Jews 
were interned on the Isle of Man, British newspapers blurred the distinctions between refugee, 
alien and enemy, so today, according to Alasdair Mackenzie, coordinator of [UK] Asylum Aid, 
‘There’s general confusion in many newspapers between an asylum seeker and someone from 
abroad—everyone gets tarred with the same brush.’”[47] In point of fact, the burden borne by 
Western liberal democracies represents but a small share of the world’s total displaced 
population, yet flows into the West are considered disproportionately threatening relative to their 
size.[48] Within these states, pundits, politicians, and even some policymakers argue that 
migrants who are from different religious, linguistic, and ethnic backgrounds than the majority in 
their newly adopted homelands are a danger to societal security. Popular discourses that draw on 
traditional nationalistic sentiments and xenophobic assertions, such as Samuel Huntington’s 
Clash of Civilizations and Who Are We? and Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy,” assert 
that current waves of migrants and refugees reduce national living standards by siphoning away 
social resources from “real” citizens, taking employment away from more qualified applicants, 
bringing tensions from their home state with them, and committing a disproportionate amount of 
crime.[49] 
Resistors and Restrictionists 
Consequently, although most Western states are normatively, if not legally, bound to offer refuge 
and protection for those fleeing persecution, violence, and, in some cases, privation, at least 
some segment of most target states’ populations is usually unwilling to bear the real or perceived 
domestic economic and social costs and security risks of doing so. This resistance offers coercers 
a potential wedge through which they can inflict pain that can endanger a leader’s relationship 
with his or her core supporters or even stimulate general unrest within a target state. Indeed, in 
contrast to most foreign policy issues, refugees and immigration have engaged Western publics 
like few others, especially in regions that have been host to the largest numbers of illegal 
migrants and asylum seekers.[50] 
In one 2004 survey, 52 percent of Americans polled claimed that the present level of 
immigration represented a “critical threat to the vital interests of the United States,” and 76 
percent favored “restricting immigration as a means of combating terrorism.”[51] In a separate 
2008 survey, 61 percent said that “controlling and reducing illegal immigration” should be a very 
important U.S. foreign policy goal, a larger percentage than believed “maintaining superior 
military power worldwide” was similarly critical (57 percent).[52] The situation is analogous in 
Western Europe, where an EU-wide survey uncovered a disturbing level of racism and 
xenophobia within its member states, with nearly 33 percent of those interviewed openly 
describing themselves as “quite racist” or “very racist.”[53] More than 71 percent of those 




cultures that a society can accept,” and 65 percent of interviewees said that this limit had already 
been reached in their country.[54] In 2007, Europeans ranked immigration behind only fighting 
crime as the most important policy issue facing the EU in coming years.[55] Even the 
historically welcoming Swedes and Dutch have grown more restrictionist. In one 2003 poll, for 
example, 50 percent of Swedes polled said they were opposed to accepting large numbers of 
refugees, up from 44 percent in 2001; only 25 percent favored acceptance.[56] 
By 2007, a majority said they favored tighter restrictions on immigration as well.[57] In the 
Netherlands, 48 percent of the country’s immigrants believe there are too many migrants in the 
country, an opinion shared by 65 percent of native Dutch.[58] These sentiments are echoed 
throughout much of Asia. A 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that 89 percent of 
Indonesians and Malaysians, 84 percent of Indians, 77 percent of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, 
and 52 percent of Chinese agreed with the statement, “We should further restrict and control 
immigration.”[59] Likewise, despite being the subject of repeated rounds of domestic and 
international opprobrium because of his government’s treatment of would-be asylum seekers, 
Australian (Liberal Party) Prime Minister John Howard handily won reelection in fall 2004. 
Howard was eventually voted out of office in fall 2007, but few ascribe this loss to his tough 
stance on refugees and migrants.[60] In neighboring New Zealand, the (Labor Party) prime 
minister was able to retain power in October 2005 only after agreeing to name a politician who 
was openly hostile to refugees and migrants to the position of foreign minister.[61] 
As Oliver Cromwell Cox sums it up, the “true democratic principle” is that the people “‘shall not 
be made to do what [they do] not like.’ . . . It is only necessary that the dominant group believes 
in the menace of the cultural tenets and practices of the other group; whether or not they are 
actually harmful or not is not the crucial circumstance.”[62] Thus, whether refugees and migrants 
represent a real threat is beside the point; if they are perceived as fundamentally threatening to 
their security, culture, or livelihood, anxious and motivated individuals and groups will mobilize 
to oppose their acceptance.[62] 
Depending on the location, composition, and magnitude of any given mass migration as well as, 
to a limited extent, the stage of the business cycle, the size and nature of the objecting group(s) 
will change. In general, the most vociferous opposition tends to follow an Olsonian logic—that 
is, groups that feel threatened by the (anticipated) magnitude, speed, or endurance of an inflow 
and anticipate having to bear concentrated costs associated with said inflow will be strongly 
motivated to raise vocal objections to accepting, assimilating, or simply shouldering the burdens 
associated with the migrants or refugees.[64] In contrast to those anticipating more diffuse costs, 
such individuals and groups will have intensely held interests and strong incentives to mobilize 
against the refugees or migrants in question. Directly affected populations are frequently joined 
by nationalistic groups that favor restrictive immigration policies more generally. They tend to 
represent segments of society that expect to lose some of their social, cultural or political 
dominance to the group in question. Sometimes, however, these actors are simply political 
entrepreneurs, trying to cash in on public hostility to immigrants (and thereby derive some 




powerful enough within the European Union that they have created a formal caucus, which 
offers both more political clout and eligibility for EU funding.[65] 
Whatever the complexion of the anti-refugee/migrant camp in a given crisis, if rejectionists 
mobilize against the group in question, pressure is likely to grow for the target’s leadership to 
rebuff the group, close the state’s border(s), engage in interdiction and repatriation, or even 
undertake military action to forestall or stop the outflow at its source. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
as mobilization increases, so will pressure on the target leadership to take steps to reject or resist 
accepting responsibility for the relevant migrants or refugees. 
That said, although leader(s) within target states may experience moral qualms about adopting 
rejectionist responses, such responses need pose no significant political problems for said 
leader(s) if the majority of its population concurs with them.[66] No significant unrest will result, 
and the leadership’s support base will remain intact. Tragically, such was the case for European 
Jews trying to escape the Nazis by fleeing to the United States during the early part of World 
War II. Most would-be émigrés were rejected, and for a long time, few Americans objected.[67] 
Protectors and Promoters 
However, states hostile to migrants or refugees generally do not operate in a vacuum—nor do 
their leaderships. More commonly in societies marked by heterogeneous and competing 
interests, while the members of anti-refugee/migrant camps are lobbying for rejection, other 
equally motivated pro-refugee/migrant groups concomitantly labor to ensure that targets cannot 
eschew their normative and legal obligations to those seeking refuge from violence, persecution, 
or privation. As is true of their restrictionist counterparts, the composition, strength, and 
visibility of pro-refugee/-migrant camps varies from crisis to crisis depending on the race and 
ethnicity of the refugees/migrants in question and the expected material and/or psychic benefits 
to be derived from supporting them.[68] Pro-camps tend to be smaller than anti-camps, however, 
their members also tend to be extremely vocal, publicly savvy, and rhetorically skillful actors 
such as lawyers and activists. Given their cohesion, focus, and intensely held preferences, pro-
refugee/migrant camps may thus make up in political efficacy what they lack in numbers. 
More importantly, the relative strength of pro-refugee/migrant camps tends to be bolstered by 
their members’ connections with a variety of domestic and international NGOs and advocacy 
groups, whose raison d’etre is the protection and expansion of human rights generally and of 
migrant and refugee rights more specifically. Since the end of World War II, both refugee 
advocacy and human rights groups have increasingly joined hands with philanthropic 
organizations, concerned individuals, churches, concerned ethnic lobbies, and others to create 
transnational human rights networks that span the globe. As the Irish rock star and activist Bono 
has observed, “The administration isn’t afraid of rock stars and activists—they are used to us. 
But they are nervous of soccer moms and church folk. Now when soccer moms and church folk 
start hanging around with rock stars and activists, then they really start paying attention.”[69] 




Declaration on Human Rights, they really began to blossom after 1961—with the founding of 
Amnesty International—and to proliferate, diversify, and grow in robustness after 1970.[70] 
Indeed, the number of human rights-related NGOs doubled between 1973 and 1983, and many of 
these organizations have been growing in size and efficacy ever since, in no small part due to an 
enhanced ability to identify causes with “well-institutionalized international norms.”[71] 
These networks and their allies—members of the media, academia, legislature, and ethnic and 
political interest groups—rely on two factors in particular to exercise domestic influence over 
leaders in support of international norms.[72] The first is leaders’ desires to remain popular, 
either due to short-term electoral considerations or because of longer-term concerns about how 
they will appear in the context of history. The second is policy legitimacy.[73] Policies that 
prescribe strategies or tactics that violate norms can threaten policy legitimacy and thereby 
severely limit support for those policies in the legislature or parliament, in the media, or in the 
public at large.[74] Although the nature and scope of migration-related legal and normative 
commitments vary across states, generally speaking the human rights regime has put two major 
limits on state discretion as it pertains to policy legitimacy: the right of asylum and the principle 
of racial nondiscrimination, both of which have matured into customary international law that is 
binding on states.[75] 
The most broadly recognized manifestations of these norms can be found in the 1948 Human 
Rights Declaration, the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees, and the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees.[76] As legal scholar David Martin put it, “Before the 
development of these international instruments, opponents of a government practice might have 
been able to argue only that the measure was a bad idea. Since the adoption of such statements, 
those opponents are often able to wield a more powerful weapon in the debate, for they may then 
claim the government practice is not merely bad policy but rather violates international law.”[77] 
The need for legitimacy, particularly when coupled with a desire to remain popular or get 
reelected, can create a conduit from norms to norms-adherent behavior. [78] 
As mobilization within a pro-refugee/migrant camp grows, targets will be placed under greater 
pressure to admit, assimilate, or simply accept responsibility for a given group of refugees or 
migrants. To be clear, as is true of the converse situation, if a particular group is relatively 
popular or viewed as innocuous—such as was the case during the first exodus of Cubans to the 
United States soon after Castro took power in 1959—such pressure may prove unproblematic for 
a potential target.[79] Public opinion may remain generally favorable, making admitting, 
assimilating, or simply assuming the financial burden for a particular group of migrants or 
refugees relatively costless. Domestic unrest will not be a significant issue, nor will the target’s 
power base be threatened. 
When Rejection Collides with Protection, Vulnerability Results 
But in societies marked by disparate and competing interests and unevenly distributed costs and 




one (either the pro- or anti-) camp mobilizes in the face of a crisis will tend to be the exception 
rather than the rule. This is especially true because of the existence of concomitant splits between 
elites and the general public. In fact, recent polls suggest that there is no other foreign policy-
related issue, including controversial issues such as globalization and the importance of the UN, 
on which the U.S. public and its elites disagree more profoundly. For example, one Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations poll found that 59 percent of the U.S. public identified reducing 
illegal immigration as a “very important” foreign policy goal, compared with only 21 percent of 
those in the elite.[80] Thus, in the face of an incipient or ongoing crisis, targets will often find 
themselves facing highly polarized factions with mutually incompatible interests and, thus, 
facing a fundamental political dilemma. 
Challengers who engage in this kind of coercion recognize the existence of these political 
conundrums and purposefully aim to exploit them for their own political ends; again, this is the 
crux of the political agitating strategy. In summer 1994, for instance, boats were “being prepared 
in nearly every village along the southern coast of Haiti” in an explicit attempt to “put more 
pressure on the US to hasten the return of Aristide.” As one villager noted at the time: “We 
cannot get arms to fight. . . . The only way to fight is to get the Americans to keep their promises. 
The only way to do that is to do what they fear most [have us come to America]” (author’s 
emphasis).[81] Likewise, when East German officials quipped in the mid-1980s that their West 
German counterparts “claim they have a liberal society over there. [We will] let them prove it!,” 
they fully anticipated that loosing South Asian asylum seekers on West Germany would cause 
widespread discontent and persuade the previously reluctant West German government to 
concede to their demands.[82] And they were right.[83] 
In fact, would-be coercers often do more than simply exploit extant heterogeneity within target 
states. They may also aim to increase target vulnerability over time by acting in ways designed to 
directly or indirectly catalyze greater mobilization, heighten the degree of polarization between 
groups, and thereby reduce the available policy options open to targets. They may do so by 
increasing the size, scale, and scope of an existing outflow, shifting its character (e.g., by adding 
more members of either “undesirable” or particularly sympathetic groups), making escalatory 
threats, or simply directly lobbying members of pro- and anti- refugee/migrant camps. 
In short, challengers aim to influence targets by what is, in traditional coercion, known as force 
majeure, a choice dictated by overwhelming circumstances. Targets, of course, always have a 
choice, but one that is skewed if they believe the consequences of non-compliance will be a 
denial of future choice.[84] Thus, coercers seek to narrow a target’s set of domestic policy 
responses to an outflow—in game theory terms, to narrow the target’s win set—such that 
concession to their demands begins to appear more attractive, at least as compared to the 
possibility that the future will hold fewer, still less auspicious choices.[85] This is simply 
because, with fewer policy options available, the target’s capacity to reconcile internal political 
conflicts and satisfy competing domestic interests becomes far more circumscribed.[86] As 
Andrew Mack puts it, costs may “steadily escalate without the ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ 




become in themselves one of the political costs for the leadership. . . . Any attempt to resolve one 
contradiction will magnify the other.”[87] This can create a particularly nettlesome dilemma for 
a target’s leadership, as well as significantly narrow its room for maneuver.[88] Under such 
conditions, concession—to avoid general unrest, to avoid powerbase erosion, or to simply make 
a crisis disappear—can become increasingly appealing, which is of course exactly the coercer’s 
intent. This is not to suggest that concession in such cases is cost-free, only that in the face of a 
threatened or mounting crisis the anticipation of future pain and mounting costs has to be 
weighted against the costs and opportunities associated with ending the crisis now, by conceding 
to the challenger’s demands. 
Predicting and Measuring Coercive Success and Failure 
Consequently, targets will be most vulnerable not when their publics and/or elites are unified but 
rather when there is broad and intense disagreement about the way in which a target should 
respond to an incipient or ongoing migration crisis. Again, in Olsonian terms, targets will be 
most vulnerable when a crisis is widely expected to engender both concentrated costs (CC) and 
concentrated benefits (CB)—albeit by different segments of society—leading to high levels of 
mobilization both by those in favor of the refugee/migrant group and those opposed to the same 
group (Figure 1, Quadrant 4).[89] Conversely, in cases in which a crisis is anticipated to 
produce low or diffuse costs (DC) and only diffuse benefits (DB)—and, consequently, neither 
camp is mobilized and opinion is less polarized—targets will be least vulnerable, and coercion 
will be least likely to succeed (Quadrant 2). Indeed, in most such cases, coercion is unlikely 
even to be attempted. In cases in which only the pro-refugee/migrant camp is highly mobilized 
(Quadrant 1: DC, CB), target vulnerability will be relatively low because assimilating or 
accepting the group in question should be relatively easy. Likewise, in cases in which only the 
anti-refugee/migrant camp is mobilized (Quadrant 3: CC, DB), targets should also be relatively 
less vulnerable because the options of interdiction, border closure, or simple rejection should be 
easier to implement. That said, vulnerability in Quadrants 1 and 3 will be greater than in 
Quadrant 2 because, from those starting points, only one camp’s expectations about the relative 
size and distribution of costs and benefits needs to shift upward to move the potentially target 
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The Force Multiplier of Hypocrisy Costs 
A factor that can further enhance challengers’ probability of coercive success is target 
susceptibility to a special class of political reputational (or audience) costs that I call hypocrisy 
costs. Political hypocrisy entails the exaggeration by political actors of their state’s commitment 
to morality.[91] As I define them, therefore, hypocrisy costs are “symbolic political costs that 
can be imposed when there exists a real (or perceived) disparity between a professed 
commitment to liberal values and/or international norms, and demonstrated state actions that 
contravene such a commitment.” Hypocrisy costs are operationalized in a manner akin to what 
human rights network advocates call “accountability politics,” which is to say “once a 
government has publicly committed itself to a principle. . . networks can use those positions, and 
their command of information, to expose the distance between discourse and practice. This is 
embarrassing to many governments, which may try to save face by closing that distance” or by 
making the gap disappear altogether by ending the crisis through concession.[92] 
Political scientists and international legal scholars have traditionally focused on the normatively 
positive potential consequences of accountability politics.[93] But hypocrisy-exposing gaps 
between word and deed can equally well be exploited by actors driven by less benevolent 
motivations; in fact, the creation of such gaps can even be purposefully instigated or catalyzed by 
self-serving actors. In the context of this kind of unconventional coercion specifically, having 
failed to achieve their objectives through traditional channels of influence, challengers may 
resort to the creation or exploitation of refugee or migration crises. The existence of said crises 
may encourage targets to behave in norms-violating ways as they attempt to avoid bearing the 





Then, if normative violations do in fact follow, hypocrisy costs can be imposed by domestic and 
international pro-refugee/migrant groups seeking to protect those under threat, or even by 
challengers themselves. For instance, in the middle of the aforementioned attempt by East 
Germany to coerce West Germany in the mid-1980s, an observer on the western side 
acknowledged, “As West Germans become angry and start to say rude things about all these 
black and brown abusers of the right of asylum, it enables West Germany to be depicted as 
‘racialist’”—and in violation of its own constitution.[94] Such charges, particularly when 
coupled with the threat of future and escalating costs, can make concession more attractive, 
which again is precisely the intent![95] 
In other words, would-be coercers can effectively engage—with the (often unintentional) 
assistance of the pro-refugee/migrant camp—in a kind of norms-aided entrapment, whereby 
humanitarian norms are used as coercive cudgels by actors with selfish, self-serving motives as 
well as those with more altruistic aims, often simultaneously.[96] One might usefully conceive 
of this mechanism as a perverse manifestation of what Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink call a 
boomerang pattern—but one that operates in reverse of the normatively positive mechanism 
Keck and Sikkink describe. Instead of costs being imposed by norms-adherent actors on those 
who routinely violate them, in the case of coercive engineered migration, norms-violating actors 
seek to impose costs on those who left to their own devices generally aim to adhere to them.[97] 
The susceptibility of targets to hypocrisy costs can also be self-inflicted. But why would leaders 
make rhetorical commitments that could come back to haunt them? One reason is to expand their 
political options at home. Actors may hope their words will generate votes or offer them other 
political advantages during a campaign or at some other moment. To quote Michael Ignatieff, 
academic, activist, and Canadian Liberal Party politician, in the midst of his own attempt to 
impose hypocrisy costs on the British government: 
That is exactly what makes this cooked up indignation about bogus asylum-seekers so 
absurdly hypocritical. For after manfully attempting to whip up xenophobia against the alien 
horde of liars and cheats at our gates, both the Daily Mail and the Home Secretary piously 
profess their attachment to our “liberal traditions” in relation to right of asylum. Come off it. 
Liberalism means something. It commits you to protecting the rights of asylum-seekers to a 
hearing, legal counsel and a right of appeal. Either you treat asylum-seekers as rights-bearing 
subjects, or as an alien horde. You can’t have it both ways. When British liberal tradition has 
[Home Secretary Kenneth] Baker and the Daily Mail as its friends, it needs no enemies.[98] 
As Ignatieff’s invective suggests, potential targets can make themselves vulnerable by declaring 
certain groups of (actual or potential) migrants “victims” who are worthy of protection or 
refuge—for instance, by referring to members of a particular group as refugees whether or not 
they would appear to fit the legal definition—but then failing to uphold the normative and legal 




Such norms-enhanced designations may be applied to a broad group for ideological reasons, as 
was the case when Western leaders promised to welcome all those “fleeing with their feet” from 
communism during the Cold War, all the while hoping few would come. According to Cheryl 
Benard, these states very much wanted to “contrast favorably with the communist countries” and 
to “present life in the West in the best possible light.” On the other hand, they did “not want to 
encourage more refugees to come” because they “would never be genuinely welcomed.”[100] In 
trying to have it both ways, Western countries routinely placed themselves in rhetorical and 
normative binds.  
These tendencies did not die with the end of the Cold War. Aspiring and incumbent political 
leaders sometimes also apply normatively privileged designations more narrowly to particular 
ethnic, religious, or national groups.[101] They may do so to broaden their popularity with new 
segments of their electorates, to shore up their traditional power bases, or—in the midst of active 
electoral competitions—to draw distinctions between themselves and their competitors, 
distinctions for which they may be later held to account. 
Sometimes actors employ migration-related, normatively enhanced rhetoric with the aim of 
obtaining not just domestic but also international approval and praise—which may be of value in 
and of itself, especially for actors concerned about their status and reputation. For example, the 
1997 Italian decision to launch Operation Alba was driven not solely by Albanian President Sali 
Berisha’s promise that the flow of Albanians across the Adriatic would end if Italy delivered aid 
and military assistance, but also by the Italian imperative “to take into account both Italian 
popular opinion regarding Albanians,” [which was, to put it mildly, not positive][102] and 
“Italy’s aspirations in joining the EMU.” At the time, Romano Prodi’s government justified the 
intervention “in terms of how the Europeans would see them” and “the impression on Europe 
that its politics would make.”[103] 
Even if individual politicians have not personally made rhetorically problematic statements, they 
may nevertheless find themselves vulnerable to hypocrisy costs based on the actions (or 
historical positions) of their predecessors and, in particular, as a result of long-standing national 
commitments to a specific group or groups. (The U.S.’s relationship with Cubans is but one 
obvious example.) As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has quipped, “standards solemnly declared, even if 
unobserved, live on to supply ammunition to those who thereafter demand observance.”[104] 
Whether leaders resort to the use of normatively exalted rhetoric for instrumental reasons or 
actually espouse the values they articulate is immaterial. In either case, leaders who employ such 
rhetoric may set the stage for having to make good on those rhetorical claims or face the political 
costs of failing to do so, if their actions fail to comport with their articulated commitments.[105] 
Norms need not even be what Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink call “socialized” to be 
effective cudgels; they need only be recognized as being important to a segment of society that 
can inflict costly punishment on the target.[106] Hence, to the extent that politically costly 
charges of hypocrisy can be leveled against a target, its vulnerability to coercion will 




interests can be independently sufficient to persuade leaders to concede. Neither is the imposition 
of hypocrisy costs a guarantee of coercive success.[108] Nevertheless, in the face of acute 
heterogeneity and high pro- and anti-camp mobilization, hypocrisy costs can serve as effective 
force multipliers that enhance the vulnerability of certain leaders and certain targets to migration-
driven coercion. 
Target Defenses and Evasive Actions 
To be sure, coercion is not a one-sided game, and targets are not without recourse. Although, due 
to their generally liberal democratic nature, the majority of targets are constrained from 
responding in kind (by initiating outflows of their own), many do find ways to fight back and to 
resist, sometimes successfully. Three responses in particular warrant mention. First, under 
certain conditions, targets can externalize, outsource, or simply buck-pass the visible (and 
politically costly) consequences of migration crises onto others, thereby skirting successful 
coercion by persuading third parties to warehouse, host, or even assimilate an undesirable 
group.[109] Transferring responsibility is not always an option, however, particularly if the 
displaced are already inside the target state or if other potential host or asylum states themselves 
fear destabilizing consequences associated with an influx. 
Second, some target governments manage to navigate the political shoals represented by their 
constituents’ mutually incompatible interests, by assuaging one or another camp through the use 
of side-payments or by changing mobilized actors’ minds about the desirability of a given 
migrant or refugee group through issue redefinition. In other words, leaders may succeed in 
shifting domestic perceptions of the expected costs or benefits associated with a particular 
influx.[110] Third, targets may successfully launch military action—or threaten to do so—to 
forestall or stop outflows at the source. Indeed, sometimes targets even use the threat of 
hypothetical outflows to justify military actions they wish to take for other reasons. In a 1982 
speech before the National Governor’s Association, for instance, former U.S. Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig sought to raise support for U.S. interventions in Latin America with reference to 
the potential migration-generating consequences of failing to act.[111] President Ronald Reagan 
used similarly inflammatory language in a speech the following year, claiming that a failure to 
forestall the installation of Marxist regimes in the region could result in “a tidal wave of 
refugees—and this time they’ll be feet people, not boat people—swarming into our country 
seeking a safe haven from Communist repression to our south.”[112] Sometimes targets simply 
convincingly threaten other actions that persuade challengers to back down or staunch an 
outflow. When evasion succeeds, coercion will fail, or at least be less successful than challengers 
may have hoped or anticipated. 
Coercion can also fail because of miscalculations by challengers themselves. For instance, 
although such cases appear to be relatively unusual, attempted migration-driven coercion may—
like strategic bombing—unify the target’s population rather than polarize it. Similarly, if a group 
of migrants or refugees—previously viewed with skepticism or hostility—is effectively recast as 




evaporate and with it the possibility of successful coercion.[113] This is a key point that 
reinforces the fact of the dynamic nature of this coercive, two-level game. More broadly, 
whenever there are significant downward shifts in the level of mobilization of (and degree of 
polarization between) pro- and anti-camps over time, coercion is likely to fail. 
The ability to effect successful coercion in the migration realm is further inhibited, in part, by the 
fact that relatively few of these crises ever reach the desk of target state executive(s). Instead, 
most remain within Quadrant 2 (of Figure 1) and off the radar screen of the country’s executive 
branch. As Morton Halperin, former National Security Council (NSC) member, has noted vis-à-
vis the U.S. context, leaders “lack the time or inclination to concern themselves with such issues. 
A president might link a particular policy with a particular disaster, but the bottom line is that the 
president is just too busy to focus upon anything but the larger strategic issues.”[114] Thus, 
whatever its normative repercussions, a migration crisis will become an issue of executive-level 
concern only when a failure to make it disappear promises to inflict tangible political costs on the 
target’s leader(s)—in short, only when a crisis moves toward the danger zone of Quadrant 4. 
Nevertheless, as we have now seen, migration-driven coercive attempts happen at least once a 
year. Moreover, when attempted, coercive engineered migration has succeeded at least in part 
almost three-quarters of the time, most often against relatively powerful, advanced liberal 
democracies. In light of all we know about international politics, coupled with all the 
aforementioned potential obstacles to success, why should this be the case? 
Why Liberal Democracies are Particularly Vulnerable 
Advanced liberal democracies are particularly susceptible to the imposition of hypocrisy costs 
(and to coercive engineered migration, more generally) for two interrelated and self-reinforcing 
reasons, each of which reflects a distinct conception of what are traditionally viewed as liberal 
values and virtues. The first factor—a consequence of what is often referred to as normative or 
embedded liberalism—is that the majority of liberal democracies have codified commitments to 
human rights and refugee protection through instruments such as the 1948 Human Rights 
Declaration, the 1951 Convention, and the 1967 Protocol.[115] These international conventions 
and associated domestic laws not only provide a set of normative standards against which the 
actions of actors can be judged but also place certain legal obligations on states to meet the 
responsibilities they impose. 
On the one hand, such codified commitments provide certain protections and guarantees for 
those forced to leave their home countries in times of crisis and under duress. On the other hand, 
however, these same safeguards constrain the ability of states to control their borders and so 
afford other actors bargaining leverage over signatory states through the employment of norms-
enabled (political and legal) entrapment. As James Hampshire observes (albeit only with actors 
with beneficent intentions in mind), “International law plays a role, not so much as an external 
constraint upon national sovereignty . . . but as a source of liberal norms, which can be mobilized 




organizations.”[116] Simply put, norms do, as many argue, “provide incentives and disincentives 
for different kinds of actions” for those who embrace them. 
They also, however, provide incentives and disincentives for exploitation of these same norms—
sometimes with the indirect assistance of well-meaning activists and jurists.[117] Hence, as the 
adoption and codification of relevant norms grows, and the extent to which individual rights are 
constitutionally protected increases—and, by extension, what we might refer to as normative 
liberalization rises—susceptibility to hypocrisy costs likewise grows, and vulnerability to 
coercion concomitantly increases.   
The second source of particular liberal democratic vulnerability lies in the transparent and 
inherently conflictual nature of political decision making within these states. This political 
liberalism manifests itself, among other ways, in a wide variety of domestic political 
arrangements that provide access points for societal groups to influence governmental policy. As 
I discuss further below, there is great variation in the nature and scope of these arrangements, as 
well as in their level of transparency. Thus the degree to which this factor constrains the policy 
options available to target leaderships facing real or threatened crises varies significantly, even 
among liberal democracies. Nevertheless, politically liberal states share certain vulnerability-
enhancing tendencies in common. For one thing, not only do opposition parties in democracies 
tend to have strong incentives to criticize and publicize missteps by sitting governments, but they 
also face powerful political incentives to adopt positions that run counter to those embraced by 
incumbents, whether or not those policies are currently viewed as problematic.[118] Thus, 
opposition leaders may add the handling of an ongoing migration or refugee crisis to their list of 
grievances, and the position adopted could be either in favor or opposed to the displaced. For 
instance, the opposition may contend that the government is “betraying a just cause and 
sabotaging the political rights” of a group of migrants or refugees or they may equally well claim 
the government “has sold out to the refugees [or migrants] at the expense of the nation 
itself.”[119] 
Consequently, bold assertions by the leaders of target states that they can withstand the 
competing, often intense domestic political pressures exerted by a migration or refugee crisis—
and thus will not ultimately concede to coercers’ demands—may ring hollow to challengers, who 
can readily observe the sometimes hostile and escalatory push and pull of democratic political 
battles.[120] In short, this particular (political liberalism-motivated) vulnerability arises from the 
fact that liberal democracies espouse what are supposed to be absolutist principles, but cross-
cutting cleavages and the inherently conflictual nature of pluralistic politics make them anything 
but absolute. As Alexis de Tocqueville long ago:  
Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; 
they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. . . . a 
democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, 
persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot 




In other words, just as credibility can be a major problem for weak actors trying to convince 
more powerful ones to comply with their demands, credibility can prove equally problematic for 
powerful states if they are liberal democracies. 
Of course, states (liberal and otherwise) do differ significantly in their capacities to shape—and 
be shaped—by their societies. The structural position of a state in relation to its society can be 
viewed as varying along a continuum from decentralized and constrained by societal groups to 
centralized and insulated from society. 
Analytically speaking, we can distinguish between “soft” (decentralized and constrained) and 
“hard” (centralized and autonomous) states.[122] “Soft” states tend to be characterized by a high 
number of policy inputs and actors and relatively low levels of policy autonomy. Because they 
are most exposed to the vagaries of pluralism, we consequently expect the most highly 
liberalized and decentralized soft states (such as the United States) to be the most vulnerable of 
all.[123] Although further research is necessary to confirm the preliminary findings offered here, 
the data in Table 1, which demonstrates that the United States appears to have been the single 
most popular target of migration-driven coercion between 1951 and 2006, support this 
proposition. 
In sum, codified commitments to protect human rights and pluralistic politics can interact in such a 
way as to offer would-be coercers powerful bargaining leverage via exploitation of what liberal 
targets rightly view as their virtues and, in effect, transform liberal democratic virtues into 
international bargaining vices.[124] To reiterate, this represents the converse of traditional two-
level games logic: Whereas in traditional two-level games, domestic actors seek to convince their 
international counterparts that they face significant constraints on their autonomy, in the coercive 
context, they seek to convey the precisely the opposite impression. But due to the independent and 
joint effects of normative and political liberalism within liberal democracies, this can prove 
onerous at best. 
Moving beyond Liberal Democracies 
Although liberal democracies are particularly vulnerable to this unconventional brand of 
coercion, they are not equally vulnerable; nor are they exclusively so. For one thing, variation 
exists in levels of political and normative liberalization across liberal states. For another, many 
illiberal states possess some liberal characteristics and exhibit some measure of political and 
normative liberalization—sometimes more than their supposedly liberal counterparts. 
We can conceptualize variation in the two sources of target vulnerability in a 2 X 2 matrix as a 
function of: on one axis, variation in the degree to which the target has adopted and codified 
norms that provide rights and protections for refugees and migrants, specifically, and human 
rights, more generally (normative liberalism); and, on the other, the level of decision-making and 





















Although both factors are significant, the existence of the hypocrisy cost force multiplier 
suggests the degree of normative liberalism might be ultimately more influential than the degree 
of policymaking autonomy (political liberalism) in determining target vulnerability ex ante. On 
the other hand, politicians naturally care more about domestic politics than international 
influences, so the degree of political liberalism might be expected to offer more predictive value 
in terms of ultimate outcomes. In any case, as levels of normative and political liberalism rise 
(and policy autonomy declines) the aggregate vulnerability of a state also rises—consequently 
making “soft” liberal democracies particularly vulnerable. 
Conversely, ceteris paribus, personalistic authoritarian or totalitarian governments should be 
least vulnerable to this kind of coercion. By definition, such states are less politically liberalized 
than their democratic counterparts. They are consequently also “harder”, more centralized, and 
characterized by relatively high degrees of policy autonomy, thereby granting their leaderships 
greater latitude in responding to potential migration crises. In the aggregate, illiberal, 
authoritarian states tend to be less normatively liberalized than their democratic counterparts and 
correspondingly subject to fewer constraints on this dimension, too. As Table 1 illustrates, few 
such states appear to have been targeted, and still fewer successfully so. 
That said, only rarely are all other things equal. For one thing, not all autocracies are alike. Like 
democracies, they too differ in the level, degree, and scope of policy autonomy afforded to their 
leaderships.[126] Moreover, few leaders, even in illiberal states, can operate for long without the 
consent of at least a significant subset of their people. The size of the so-called “selectorate”—
the group of individuals formally responsible for determining the fate of the leadership of a 




answer to some subset of their constituents, so domestic discord can exercise some (albeit 
weaker) effects within these states. 
Moreover, in an era of increasing globalization, it is widely assumed that most states (illiberal or 
otherwise) want to be a part of what is often referred to as the “international community of 
states” and to reap the political and economic benefits enjoyed by its members. As Victor Cha 
puts it, illiberal regimes in the post-Cold War era have no choice but to open up simply in order 
to survive.[128] (Although the global economic crisis that began in 2008 may have dampened 
the enthusiasm of some for the global project, the sentiment largely remains.) Thus, although 
their domestic constraints are fewer, the behavior of most illiberal states is still subject to 
potentially costly, external scrutiny. Non-democracies are therefore also vulnerable to the 
imposition of hypocrisy costs by other states and by international and domestic political actors, 
albeit rather less so than their liberal democratic counterparts. 
Alternative Explanations 
Might there be other explanations that can better account for or explain the decisions of targets—
liberal or otherwise— to concede or resist? Three obvious alternatives are worth considering: (1) 
geographic proximity, (2) size of a (threatened) mass migration, and (3) prior target affinity or 
hostility toward a particular migrant/refugee group (as manifested in part by preexisting policies 
directed at relevant migrant/refugee groups). 
The first two alternatives are premised on the idea that a target’s propensity to resist or concede 
is predicated on its ability to stop or to absorb an influx. By extension, the smaller the distance 
from the source of the outflow and/or the larger the size of the outflow, the lower the probability 
that a target can independently combat or absorb the group in question, the higher the credibility 
of the threat to inflict the promised punishment on the target, and thus the greater the probability 
of coercive success. Although geographic proximity between the source of an outflow and the 
target undoubtedly increases the vulnerability of that target, propinquity is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for success. As the data in Table 2 and Table 3 illustrate, history has 
been characterized by myriad non-proximate successes and by numerous proximate failures. In 
short, geography has been far less important than the degree to which targets are held responsible 
for, and thus are compelled to respond to, particular crises—whether for historical, domestic 
constituency-driven, or geopolitical reasons. For example, given the root culpability of the 
United States for what ultimately became known as the Vietnamese boatpeople crises, it twice 
found itself vulnerable to coercion from afar by Hong Kong and a core group of ASEAN 
member states.[129] 
In terms of evaluating the second alternative explanation—real or threatened migrant outflow 
size—obtaining reliable numbers on the precise size of outflows is difficult at best. Nonetheless, 
it is reasonably easy to distinguish among orders of magnitude, from hundreds to millions. 
Again, although larger outflows assuredly place greater stress on the carrying capacities of states 




outcomes are not correlated with the scale of the unnatural disasters in question. For example, 
both Ethiopia and Poland successfully convinced Israel and Germany, respectively, to make 
concessions over groups that were small (even by per capita standards), whereas India did not 
alter its behavior to comport with Pakistani desires, despite an inflow of 10 million Bengalis who 
were relatively unwelcome for reasons other than pure numbers.[130] 
Table 2: Examining Alternatives: (Threatened) Outflow Size and Geographical Proximity 
 Challenger(s) 
Migrant/Refug
ee Group (Principal) Target(s) Outcome? 
(Expected) 






1 West Germany  East Germans United States (US) Partial Success Medium No 
2 SVN & the US 
North 
Vietnamese North Vietnam Failure 
Large Yes 
3 Alg. insurgents  Algerians 
French Allies, esp. 
United States Partial Success 
Large No 
4 Austria Hungarians United States Success Medium No 
5 United States  
E. Germans 
(Berlin) Soviet Union Indeterminate 
Med-Large No 




W. Europe, United 
States Partial Success 
Large Yes 
8 Israel Palestinians Jordan Indeterminate Large Yes 
9 Jordan  Palestinians United States 
SR Success;  
LR Failure*** 
Large No 
10 Pakistan  East Pakistanis India Failure Large Yes 
11 Uganda 
UK passport 
holders.  United Kingdom Failure 
Medium No 
12 Bangladesh Rohingyas Burma Success Medium Yes 
13 ASEAN, HK Indochinese Western GPs, esp. US Success Large Yes 
14 Vietnam Vietnamese Euro. Cmty. (EC), US Indeterminate Medium No 
15 Thailand Cambodians United States; China Success Large No; Yes 
16 Haiti  Haitians United States Success Medium Yes 
17 NGO activists  Haitians United States; Haiti Failure Medium Yes 
18 Pakistan  Afghans United States Success Large No 
19 Soviet Union Afghans Pakistan Failure Large Yes 
20 
Afghani. 
insurgents Afghans Pakistan Success 
Large Yes 
21 Cuba  Cubans United States Partial Success Medium Yes 
22 Austria Poles W. Europe, US Success Medium No 
23 Thailand Vietnamese United States; France Success Medium No 
24 Honduras  Mostly Contras United States Success Medium No 
25 Bangladesh 
Chittag. 
/Chakmas India Indeterminate 
Medium Yes 
26 East Germany  Mixed West Germany Success Medium Yes 









29 HK, ASEAN Viet. boatpeople 
Western great powers, 
esp. United States Success 
Large No 
30 Vietnam  Vietnamese EC/EU, US Success Large No 




32 Saudi Arabia 
Yemeni 
laborers Yemen Failure 
Large Yes 
33 Israel  Soviet Jews Palestinians Failure (so far) Small-Med Yes 
34 United States Soviet Jews Israel Partial Success Small-Med No 
35 Albania Albanians Italy Success Medium Yes 
36 Albania Albanians Italy, EC Success Medium Yes 
37 Albania 
Greek 
Albanians Greece Success 
Medium Yes 
38 Poland Poles; Mixed EC, US Indeterminate Large Yes; No 
39 Ethiopia Falashas Israel Success Small-Med No 
40 Turkey Iraqis United States Success Large No 
41 Aristide Haitians United States Success Medium Yes 
42 Bosniaks Bosnians UN Security Council Partial Success Large Mixed 
43 Poland  Poles Germany Success Small-Med Yes 
44 Cuba Cubans United States Success Medium Yes 
45 Zaire Rwandans 
Largely US, France and 
Belgium Success 
Large No 
46 Libya  Palestinians Egypt Failure Small Yes 
47 North Korea North Koreans China Success Large Yes 
48 Albania Albanians Italy Success Medium Yes 
49 Turkey  Kurds Italy Indeterminate Small Yes 
50 KLA  
Kosovar 




Albanians NATO, esp. G,G, I**** Failure 
Large Mixed 
52 Macedonia I 
Kosovar 
Albanians NATO Success 
Large Mixed 
53 Macedonia II 
Kosovar 
Albanians NATO Success 
Large Mixed 
54 Nauru  
Mixed--S. 
Asians Australia Success 
Small No 
55 Belarus  Mixed EU Failure Large Yes 
56 
Activists/NGO 










58 North Korea North Koreans China Success Large Yes 
59 Nauru Mixed Australia Success Small No 
60 Haiti Haitians United States Failure Med-Large Yes 
61 Belarus Mixed EU Failure Large Yes 
62 Libya  
Mixed-N. 
African EU Success 
Medium Yes 





African EU Partial Success 
Medium Yes 
* Small outflows:  15,000+/-, Medium outflows: 15,000-500,000+/- and Large outflows: 500,000 and up; ** 
Geographically proximate refers to those states that are directly adjacent to, or whose borders lie within several 
hundred miles of, the source of the outflow; *** SR=short run, LR=long run; and **** Germany, Greece, Italy 
This leaves us with the final alternative, prior affinity or hostility toward a particular 
refugee/migrant group. It has been hypothesized that a prior affinity or historical (e.g., colonial) 




But in which direction? In favor of the group or against it? On the one hand, it is widely 
understood that target countries in which particular immigrant communities have become well 
established can have significant influence over their leaders, which would lead to enhanced 
support and heightened mobilization within the pro-refugee/migrant camp.[131] And it is 
certainly true that asylum burdens are strongly (positively) correlated with historical links 





























Table III: Why Alternative Explanations Are Insufficient 
On the other hand, however, research has also shown that, historically, hostility and envy have 
not been highest vis-à-vis entirely foreign groups but, rather, groups “who have some ethnic or 
other affinity to that host country—such as Algerian pied noir forced to return to France in the 
1960s after the war of independence, displaced Germans resettling in West Germany after World 
War II, Ugandan Asians with British passports admitted to England, and Afghan Pathans moving 
into ethnically-related areas of Pakistan.”[133] Thus, it could equally well be true that prior 
relationships with migrant groups enhance the strength and size of the anti-refugee/migrant 
camp.[134] 
Likewise, both situations—highly developed affinity in one segment of society and highly 
developed hostility in another—could simultaneously obtain, making coercive success still more 
likely. As Robert Art rightly noted, “previous immigration into a target state and its immigration 
policies [toward that group can] play an important role, [however] that role only has significant 




existing relationships with particular migrant/refugee groups can and often do play a measurable 
role in determining outcomes, but whether those effects make coercive success more or less 
probable is case-specific, rather than systematically correlated (either directly or inversely) with 
the nature of the preexisting relationship or policies. More to the point, prior relationships will 
indeed heighten potential effects in cases in which crises become salient to pro- or anti-camps (or 
to both). However, neither the existence of previous policies nor the nature of extant 
relationships is independently determinative, i.e., neither one is a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for determining outcomes. 
Broader Implications and Further Applications 
This proposed theory and analysis offered in this article have clear policy implications in today’s 
immigration anxiety-ridden environment. Long before September 11 galvanized a new 
preoccupation with border security, issues surrounding refugees and illegal migrants had 
transmuted in many countries from a matter of low politics to high politics, involving a shift in 
the definition of national security threats and in the practice of security policy. And while the 
potential significance of this kind of coercion has been underappreciated by many migration 
scholars, the same cannot necessarily be said for potential target states.[136] For example, U.S. 
National Intelligence Estimates have included warnings of U.S. vulnerability to this kind of 
coercion and have recommended taking steps to guard against future predation.[137] Similarly, 
in 2007 Australia shut down the Pacific Solution in no small part to guard itself against future 
coercive attempts by the tiny island of Nauru. Likewise, in 2003 alone the European Union 
committed to spending 400 million euros to increase border security, at least in part to deter 
future migration-driven coercion; and in 2006, China constructed a fence along part of its border 
with North Korea to impede cross-border movements.[138] Some states have even conducted 
military exercises designed to leave them better prepared to respond to potential massive influxes 
across their borders.[139] 
Moreover, the related political and national security implications extend far beyond the 
politically charged realms of immigration, asylum, and border security policy. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that the non-spontaneous “flood of refugees from East to West Germany in 1989 
. . . helped to bring down the Berlin Wall, expedited the unification of the two German states, 
and generated the most significant transformation in international relations since World War 
II.”[140] Migration and refugee flows have likewise been identified as one of the most 
significant causes of armed conflict in the post-Cold War period.[141] Since 2004 alone, we 
have witnessed the consequences of coercive engineered migration in arenas as significant and 
diverse as economic sanctions and arms embargoes (the EU lifted the last remaining sanctions 
against Libya in exchange for assistance in staunching the flow of North Africans into western 
Europe);[142] ethnic conflict, military intervention, and interstate war (between Sudan and Chad, 
over refugees from Darfur); and nuclear proliferation and regime change (in that China’s fears of 
a mass influx of North Koreans have tempered its posture toward, and dealings with, both North 




At the same time, although the analysis herein focused specifically on migration, the theory it 
develops regarding the leverage weak actors can exercise through skillful exploitation of political 
heterogeneity and normative inconsistencies (the instrumental use of norms) is more broadly 
generalizable. Indeed, the theory may be applied to any issue area in which the rhetorical 
pronouncements and/or juridical and normative commitments of actors and governments come 
into conflict with their observed behavior.[144] Additional potential applications include 
humanitarian intervention; wartime rules of engagement; and policies regarding sanctions, 
embargoes, and other non-lethal instruments of persuasion. Furthermore, states and their 
leaderships are also not the only targets of hypocrisy-based political pressure. Norms, just like 
human beings, can be wielded as coercive weapons, and they can be wielded in the service of 
beneficent and altruistic goals, as well as self-serving and immoral ones. While further research 
is necessary to better understand how, where, and how successfully this unconventional method 
of influence can be employed outside the migration realm, the significance of this kind of norms-
driven, two-level coercion should be neither underestimated nor ignored. 
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